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) 
[L. A. No. 29615. In Bank. Apr. 15, 1969.] 
RAY C. HOLMES et a1., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DAVID 
H. BRICKER, INC., Defendant and Respondent. 
[1] Actions-Splitting of Causes of Action-Application of Rule. 
-Under the rule that all damages for a single breach of 
contract must be recovered in one action, a single breach of an 
express warranty, essentially contractual in character, created 
by agreement of the parties, not arising by operation of law, and 
subject to negotintion and modification iLt the time the con-
tract was entered into, did not give rise to two causes of 
action when it resulted in injury to both person and property; 
and in an action to recover damages for injury to an automo-
bile based on such a warranty of good operating condition in 
the purchase agreement, the trial court properly sustained 
defendant's demurrer without leave to amend, where it 
appeared that the breach of warranty alleged was the identi-
cal breach of express contractual warranty alleged in the first 
cause of action in a five-cause-of-nction complaint in a prior 
suit for personal injuries in which the plaintiffs secured judg-
ment, and identical thereto except for the damages alleged. 
[1] Simultaneous injury to person and property as giving rise to 
single cause of action, note, 62 A.L.B..2d 977. See also Cal.Jur.2d, 
Actions, § 75 et seq j Am.Jur.2d, Actions, § 135 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Actions, Proceedings and Remedies, 
§ 73. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the 
Los Angeles Judicial District of Los Angeles County. Alan G. 
Campbell, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for property damage arising out of an automobile 
accident. Judgment of dismissal after demurrer was sustained 
without leave to amend affirmed. 
Ira Jacoves, Gilbert, Thompson & Kelly and Jean Wunder-
lich for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
Dulaney W. Palmer for Defendant and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiffs brought this action in the 
municipal court to recover damages for injury to their auto-
mobile. The court sustained· defendant's demurrer to the 
complaint without leave to amend on the ground that the 
action was barred by a judgment plaintiffs had obtained for 
personal injuries suffered in the same accident. Plaintiffs 
appeal from the ensuing judgment of dismissal,1 
On August 24, 1962, plaintiffs purchased a used automobile 
from defendant. The contract of sale contained an express 
warranty that" The used car sold herein is hereby warranted 
to be in good operatin~ondition and to remain in such con-
dition under normal ~ and service for a period of 30 days or 
1000 miles, (whichever comes first) after delivery." On Sep-
tember 15, 1962, while Mr. Holmes was driving and Mrs. 
Holmes was riding as a passenger, the automobile crashed into 
a fixed object along a downgrade on a mountain road, causing 
injuries to plaintiffs and damage to the automobile. 
On September 6, 1963, plaintiffs filed an action against 
defendant in the superior court to recover damages for their 
personal injuries. Their complaint pleaded five causes of 
action, each of which alleged that the accident was caused by 
defective brakes. The first cause of action sought recovery for 
breach of the express warranty quoted above; the second 
alleged breach of other express warranties and of the implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose 
intended; the third alleged defendant's failure to test and 
adjust the brakes as required by Vehicle Code section 24007; 
the fourth alleged negligent servicing, testing, and inspecting; 
IPlaintiffs' motion to reconsider was denied, and the jUdgment of dis-
missal was affirmed by the appellate department of the superior court 
and by the Court of Appeal upon certification of the cause to that court 
Wlder nIle 63 (n) of the California Rules of Court. 
J 
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and the fifth sought recovery on the basis of fraudulent repre-
sentation that the automobile was in good condition. 
On March 9, 1967, a jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs 
for $49,400, and the judgment entered on the verdict has 
become final. 
On February 23, 1966, while the personal injury action was 
pending, plaintiffs filed this action against defendant in the 
municipal court for $1,138.12, the amount of damage to the 
automobile in the 1962 accident. The complaint pleaded two 
causes of action. The first was based on the express warranty 
in the purchase agreement. It was identical with the first 
cause of action in the 1963 personal injury complaint except 
for the damages alleged. The second sought recovery on the 
basis of fraudulent misrepresentations. It was dismissed by 
stipulation and thereafter the court sustained defendant's 
demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend, on the 
ground that "Plaintiff could and should have urged in the 
Superior Court action, the claim that is now made in the first 
cause of action. " 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court's ruling is contrary 
to the settled rule that conduct that simultaneously causes 
harm both to the person and to the property of one individual 
gives rise to two separate and distinct causes of action, one 
for violation of the right to freedom from legally impermis-
sible interference with the integrity of the person and one for 
violation of the right to quiet enjoyment of property. This 
application of the primary rights theory of causes of action in 
California was first reflected in the permissive joinder provi-
sions of the practice act of 1851 based on the original Field 
Code. (Stats. 1851, ch. 5, § 64, pp. 59-60.) 2 Those provisions 
distinguished between causes of action arising out of injuries 
to person and causes of action arising out of injuries to prop-
erty and did not recognize any cause of action that would 
include tortious injuries to both person and property. AI. 
2" The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same com-
plaint, when they all arise out of: 
"lat. Contracts, express or implied; or, 
"2d. Claims to recover specific real property ..• or, 
"3d. Claims to recover specific personal property • • • Of, 
, '4th. Claims against a trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by opera-
tion of law; or, 
"5th. Injuries to character; or, 
"6th. Injuries to person; or, 
, '7th. Injuries to property. But the causes of action 80 united shall all 
belong to one only of these classes, and shall affect all the parties to the 
action, and not require different places of trial, and shall be separately 
stated. " 
) 
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though the Legislature has broadened the scope of permissible 
joinder of causes of action since 1851, it has consistently 
recognized, both in the joinder provisions (see, e.g., Code Civ. 
I'roc., § 427; Stats. 1915, ch. 28, § 1, p. 30; Stats. 1855, ch. 155, 
§ 4, pp. 196-197) and in the applicable statutes of limitation 
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 340.3 linjury to person] and 338.3 
[injury to property]) that the causes of action for injuries to 
person and property are separate. The cases and the commen-
tators are in accord. (Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal 
690, 693 (dictum) [28 P.2d 916] ; Bowman v. Wohlke (1913) 
166 Cal 121 [135 P. 37, Ann. Cas. 1915B 1011]; Lamb v. 
Harbaugh (1895) 105 Cal 680 [39 P. 56] ; McCarty v. Fre-
mont (1863) 23 Cal. 196; Morgan v. French (1945) 70 Cal 
App.2d 785, 787 (dictum) [161 P.2d 800] ; Pratt v. Vaughan 
(1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 722 [38 P.2d 799] ; Ross v. Goins (1921) 
51 Cal.App. 412 [197 P. 132] ; Weisshand v. City of Petaluma 
(1918) 37 CalApp. 296, 302 [174 P.955] ; Schermerhorn v. 
Los AngeZes Pac. R.R. Co. (1912) 18 Cal.App. 454 [123 P. 
351] ; see 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Judgment § "64(b) ; 
Toelle, Joinder of Actions With Special Reference to the 
Montana and California Practice (1930) 18 Cal.L.Rev. 459, 
468; (1952) 4O~al.L.ReV, 412, 416; (1948) 1 Stan.L.Rev. 
156; (1935) 23 al.L.Rev. 101, 101-103; (1929) 3 So.Cal.L. 
Rev. 63, 64; 29 l.Jur.2d Judgments (1956) § 259, p. 226; 
Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 977, 1001, 1005; Annot., 64 A.L.R. 
663, 670; Al}.not., 47 A.L.R. 536, 538; 51 L.R.A. 319 (1914).) 
Kidd v. Hillman (1936) 14 Cal.App.2d 507 [58 P.2d 662], 
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Winfield (1938) 24 Cal.App. 
"2d 477 [75 P.2d 525], and Pacific Indem. Group v. Dunton 
(1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 504 [52 CalRptr. 332], invoked by 
defendant, are not to the contrary. In each of these cases a 
former judgment had included recovery for both personal 
injuries and property damage growing out of an automobile 
accident and the court recognized that the former judgment 
could be pleaded as a defense to a later action for additional 
property damage. Accordingly, they involved only the appli-
cation of the settled rule that a separate cause of action does 
not arise for each separate item of property damaged as a 
result of one tortious act. (Sanderson v. Niemann (1941) 17 
Ca1.2d 563,572 [110 P.2d 1025].) 
[1] In the present case, however, plaintiffs have not 
pleaded a cause of action for tortious injury to their automo-
bile, but for breach of the express written warranty in the 
eontr&!t of sale. The breaeh alleged is the identieal breaeh of 
-..... -. 
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warranty alleged in their first cause of action in the prior suit. 
Accordingly, the crucial question is whether a single breach of 
the express warranty gave rise to two causes of action when it 
resulted in injury to both the persons and the property of· 
plaintiffs. We hold that it did not. The warranty pleaded in 
this case was essentially contractual in character. It was 
created by agreement of the parties; it did not arise by opera-
tion of law; and it was subject to negotiation and modifica-
tion at the time the contract was entered into. Under these 
circumstances the applicable rule is that all damages for a 
single breach of contract must be recovered in one action. 
(Coughlin v. Blair (1953) 41 Cal.2d 587, 598 [262 P.2d 305] ;' 
. Abbot v. 76 Land cf4 Water Co. (1911) 161 Cal. 42 [118 P. 
425]; see 4 Corbin on Contracts (1951) §§ 946,948 and 955; 1 
Williston on Sales (rev. ed. 1948) .§ 197; Rest., Contracts, 
§ 327, (b); see also, Proctor v. Southern Cal. Ryo Coo (1900) 
130 Cal. 20 [62 Po 306,509] ; Jones v. 80 So Cortes (1861) 17 
. Cal. 487 [79 Am.Dec.142]0) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
McComb, JOt Peters, Jo, Tobriner, Jo, Mosk, Jo, Burke, Jo, 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. . 
